An objective situation assessment demands analysis from each connected perspective, because ignoring one or another through ignorance or preference makes it a meaningless task and increases the probability of catastrophic decision-making. And in this particular theatre the quality of objective deep ‘Russia knowledge’ in the Atlanticistsphere is wafer thin; to those having some deeper cognizance of the country, evidence of this is everywhere.

If you still believe it began in 2022 – please leave now; to still accept this is infantile. What is the premise of this war? A segment of the Atlantic hawks believe that it can bring about the downfall of Putin by escalating the Ukrainian war with Russia, and has been working towards this for two decades. The conceptual spice is that having no real comprehension of Russia makes the risks of entanglement so much more dangerous. Why this is so is another issue for another paper. But one of the popular foundations of why, is a nebulous set of beliefs in the US which thinks that some kind of regime change in Russia can be achieved and exploited – probably connected with an aim to neutralize Russia against a further ambition against China. If the strategic aim is to break-up the Russian Federation, this was much debated in the 90s – and rapidly and wisely consigned to the trashcan. Russia is now the fourth largest economy in the World by PPP (World Bank).

Then there is Ukraine: the Maidan coup and the rise of Zelensky – the light entertainer who became popular playing a fictitious and idealized Ukrainian president on a television serial. So disaffected was the population with its political reality, and so cynically detached was it from them – they voted him in. Except that this Servant of the People was the impersonation of his sponsor Ihor Kolomoisky – the Ukrainian/ Israeli oligarch, nationalist and founder of the Azov neo-Nazi battalion. We’re told that since the various cadres of this and other oligarch private armies have been integrated into the national army they’re no longer extremists. Since then Kolomoisky has been arrested on money-laundering charges.

For the Russian part: this confrontation did not begin in 2022. In 2002, the US withdrew from the landmark Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972) with a plan to place tactical missiles within striking range of Russia. The Russians perceived a significance, and together with this and other actions such as the statement that Ukraine would join NATO, created a change of mood in which Russia has perceived an increasing direct threat. Signals about this to the Americans have gone unheeded and in the subsequent formless miasma of non-communication we have escalated ever closer towards a major confrontation.

Are the Atlanticistwar hawks right? Can a limited war be won? Can a regime change in Russia be achieved? This is where reality and perception fly apart. This can’t be covered adequately in a thousand-word synopsis, but one factor has remained consistent: Ukraine’s strategiccommand knows that it can never defeat Russia. Hence, its policy has been to work to escalate until NATO becomes a direct party to the war, which then – they believe will alter the balance of force and affect some kind of beneficial net result. The Atlantic hawks have continued to push Ukraine because they believe this is a low risk proposition for the West. First, because the loss of manpower is passed uniquely onto Ukraine; second, all financial costs are supposedly defrayed by simply printing as much money as is required; third, and most misguidedly – they are settled on a belief that the threat of a war with the US/NATO will either create sufficient internal disturbance inside Russia to remove Putin, or alternatively – that a war with Russia can be won. And herein is the danger that comes with not knowing your enemy. There is no evidence of Russia wanting to expand through all of Ukraine let alone Europe, and it has never once been stated by Russia as an aim. Nor does Russia have the military capability to engage this. Its concern is the military neutrality of Ukraine and the protection of access to the port of Sevastopol, which had been under a long-term lease from Ukraine[1].

As for the actual capability of the US/NATO: its limited capability to supply a major conventional war has already been shown to be weak in Ukraine, and its actual force projection is overestimated. Most of its hardware is not prepared for a drone/missile land war; it does not have an effective shield against Russian missile attack; a lot of its EW capability is probably inferior to Russia’s – which would badly expose troops; and it would struggle to place an adequately sized peer level force on the ground. For example, the UK has an army of about 73,000, but its infantry is approximately 10,000. Copy and paste through NATO member states and one sees a different capability from the popular paperprojections. There are perhaps four capable militaries inside the bloc. There are good units within the rest, but for the most part it is inadequate for warfare of any type let aside a peer on peer war. Even establishing a viable force in Europe would be an issue because Russia controls the air and sea of within 500km of its borders, and the US no longer has the support logistics to supply and maintain a major land taskforce.

It is also an open question whether people across Europe and the United States would support a war with Russia. Particularly as the aim is so vague: ‘to protect Western values’, and to defend ‘against Russian expansion through Europe’ – when Russia has not once stated any kind of intent to ‘expand through Europe’ or even Ukraine. The West is not prepared for the shock of hundreds of thousands of dead, and to risk the sacrifice western civilization and their children’s futures for something as vague as ‘our Western values’ vizRussia? This presents a dangerous theatre where nobody can win, but whereupon mass casualty, death and civil infrastructure and economic livelihood would very quickly be wrecked. Ukraine was never the core issue.

Others’ perceptions matter

How can this begin? Russia has issued repeated warnings about escalation. Currently, the debate inside Russia about Stormshadow/ Scalp missiles is that in addition to possible site impacts – even an intercepted flight would cause missile debris to cause highly toxic fallout on the land. And, given that distrust is now on an edge, and that there is a belief that the West knows that it is strategically weak, there is a fear that warheads might soon be nuclear tipped. Russia’s decision would be how to respond. This could be in the form of a Russian direct attack, or proxy attack on supply lines of materiel coming into Ukraine: for instance in the Baltics, Poland or Romania. But Russia has also indicated that it will consider targeting the country priming the attack – which presumably would be the United Kingdom, or less probably the United States. The decision then passes to NATO to decide if this action triggers Article 5. The Americans would need to decide if a Russian response to a unilateral attack by the U.K. is an Art5 trigger. Another factor is the risk of member states detaching themselves from this approach: such as Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain, Portugal, and perhaps Germany, Turkey and France – which has been conspicuously quiet: perhaps already remembering the lessons of Suez.

Excluding channels of communication accompanied with low-level understanding of the opposition’s capability is oxygen for the momentum of escalation to a major confrontation. And in this mire, the mood in Moscow is changing: repeated warnings have been ignored in Washington as if ‘they would never dare’. It doesn’t matter what Washington says or thinks about Russia – Russia perceives a permanent and deliberate escalation of threat. No house is ever united into a single camp – which means that in Washington there is a lot to consider.

September 28, 2024

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[1] The Lease to 2042, under the Kharkov Agreement (2010) was ended by Putin after the annexation of Crimea. However, it was publicly known that Ukraine agreed the US taking over the port, and the US State Department had already tendered for the redevelopment of the port for use by the US in 2012.